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Abstract— Although the global shipping industry is experi-
encing a productivity revolution due to the adoption of IoTs
(Internet of Things), the dependence on complex data transmis-
sion and interactive centers is also increasing, which makes the
IoT-enabled Maritime Transportation Systems (MTS) one of the
most valuable but vulnerable industries against network security
attacks. To guarantee the transmission security of confidential
data, an important alternative in an untrustworthy IoT-enabled
MTS is to apply the covert timing channels. This paper mainly
introduces the construction of covert timing channel with low
bit shifting rate and high reliability by multi-stage verification
and error correction. For the covert timing channel schemes
realized by active packet loss, the packet loss noise interferes
with the channel’s reliability. However, due to the constraints of
stealthiness, the active packet loss ratio during covert communi-
cation is low, so more effective reliable strategies are needed to
reduce noise interference. In the excellent scenario, when the bit
error rate is lower than 0.08%, the transmission performance
is kept at 0.49 bps. In the good scenario with strong network
noise, although this method loses some performance, it can still
maintain the transmission performance of 0.2 bps under the
condition of bit error rate less than 1%, which effectively proves
the effectiveness of multi-stage verification and error correction.
Index Terms— Covert timing channel, IoT-enabled MTS, multi-
stage verification, robustness.
I. INTRODUCTION
FOR decades, the data security and privacy of shippingindustry are suffering from cyber-attacks aiming at money
theft, information interception and causing disruption [1]. The
Petya malware attack in 2017 made headlines in the global
media, causing massive damage and requiring Maersk to
rebuild its network of 4000 servers and 45000 PCs, resulting in
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a loss of about $300 million. In 2018, Barcelona and Santiago
ports were attacked by blackmail software, and the Geneva
headquarters of mediterranean shipping company was attacked
by malware on April 10. Investigation of the incident found
that there was no data theft and the attack affected a limited
number of computer systems. With the pervasively adoption
of IoT into the industry field, It is increasingly challenging to
transmit data safely and secretly over wireless communication
channel [2], [3], and the key agreement schemes and data
encryption schemes have been proposed in that case [4]–[7].
Although efforts have been done to ensure the data trans-
mission security, the encryption-based methods cannot resist
adversaries from inferring information from communication
patterns to obtain transmission information. The privacy of the
critical information and confidential data may be utilized if the
opponent is skillful enough to obtain and decrypt the coded
data [8]–[11]. Thus, covert timing channel is an alternative to
enhance data protection capability.
With the expansion of data transmission applications, covert
channel in the data transmission environment is the cur-
rent research hotspot [12]–[16]. In the network environment,
the construction of covert timing channel is based on packet
traffic. Covert storage channel (CSC) utilizes redundant fields
in TCP packet header, such as sequence number field, to trans-
mit secret messages [17]. Correspondingly, the rival destroys
the storage channel through data rewriting or normaliza-
tion [13], [18]. For VoIP and other applications, the packet
transmission frequency is high, and the covert channel based
on storage content is also of high performance [19], [20]. Com-
bined with steganography and other data embedding methods,
the CSC also has good effect on video and multimedia appli-
cations [20], [21] Different from the CSC, the covert timing
channel (CTC) is designed on fine tuning of the characteristics
of packet transmission and does not change the data content.
Therefore, there is no exposure risk of the temporal covert
channel when the data field is under monitored. Since the
CTC has the same transmission characteristics as the host
channel, simultaneous interpreting data content or detecting
transmission characteristics cannot identify the existed covert
traffics. Therefore, CTC is suitable for scenes with strict
concealment requirements [22]–[24].
VoLTE has been widely used in the communication systems
and industries as an LTE call solution. It is a global interoper-
ability solution that provides advanced communication func-
tions. To guarantee the transmission’s concealment, the active
packet loss rate is low. By analyzing the packet capture data,
the packet dropout rate of VoLTE video channel is higher than 
the QCI target value of LTE network, and the SNR of CTC 
is low. The packet dropout types of VoLTE are divided into 
random packet loss noise with length of 1 and continuous 
packet loss noise. For the low density random packet loss 
noise, the noise and signal can be effectively distinguished by 
embedding the check information; while for the continuous 
packet loss noise, a single set of check information cannot be 
effectively identified, so it needs to be identified by redundant 
data in multiple groups of check information. The method of 
constructing CTC based on multiple parity check is mainly 
studied. In the three levels of codeword, symbol and map-
ping matrix, the check and error correction process is added 
respectively to reduce the noise intensity layer by layer. In this 
method, three levels of verification are used, i.e., inter symbol 
check, codeword self check and inter symbol check. Combined 
with hash digest algorithm, Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) 
hash algorithm and XOR check algorithm, it achieves a lower 
bit error rate in excellent scene, and effectively reduces the 
average BER in good scene. This method’s innovations are as 
follows:
1) A CTC construction method based on multi-stage verifi-
cation and error correction is proposed, which can effectively 
reduce the bit error rate;
2) The verification and error correction method including 
three levels of inter symbol check, codeword self check and 
inter symbol check is designed to reduce the noise level layer 
by layer;
3) The proposed scheme supports transmission parameter 
adjustment to enhance robustness and ensure transmission 
performance;
4) The experimental results show that by adjusting the 
transmission metrics of the proposed scheme, the transmission 
capability, bit error rate and undetectability can be balanced, 
and the availability and effectiveness of the covert channel are 
effectively improved.
The remaining paper is divided and illustrated with this 
order: section 2 introduces the interference of network noise on 
covert timing channel, robust strategy based on inter symbol 
check, motivations, and section 3 gives the proposed schemes 
overview and introduces each parts of the covert channel. 
Section 4 mainly introduces the proposed multi-stage verifi-
cation and error correction scheme, and section 5 illustrates 
the implementation and evaluation results of the proposed 
scheme. Section 6 provides the related works about wireless 
covert channel schemes in IoT environment. Finally, section 
7 includes a brief conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
This section introduces the related background of this 
method, including the interference mode of network noise 
to the CTC, and the reliability strategy based on inter sym-
bol check. Among them, the interference of network noise 
on covert timing channel is analyzed, and the solution is 
proposed. Based on the robust strategy of inter-codeword 
verification, a verification relationship between codewords is 
proposed to improve the utilization of verification information.
Fig. 1. The Probability Mass Function(PMF) for Packet drop number of the
VoLTE video streams.
Fig. 2. The influence of continuous packet loss on error correction process.
A. Interference of Network Noise on Covert Timing Channel
It can be obviously concluded from Fig.1 that the random
packet loss rate while length = 1 is about 50% in VoLTE
video call, and the rest are continuous packet loss events.
Through CRC error detection code and other ways, the discrete
random packet loss noise can be well suppressed. For the
interference of continuous packet loss noise, the probability of
mismatching in the verification process is high, the accuracy
rate of codeword identification is reduced, and finally, the bit
error rate is increased.
As shown in Fig.2, in the case of packet loss in continuous
reading, the verification capability is degraded. The first group
S1 is the data symbol to be verified, and the second group S2 is
the candidate verification symbol. C RC(S1,I ) was calculated
in turn and compared with S2,J . Because the check symbol is
only a part of CRC hash result, the probability of collision
is high. Only part of the network noise can be identified.
At the same time, due to the lack of additional information,
the noise cannot be further identified, and finally error code
appears.
Fig. 3. The symbol packet sequence number mapping matrix: Elements in
the matrix represent for the packet numbers; Column number of is the group
number, and row numbers corresponds to the symbols.
In the ideal case, when there is noise in the data codeword
and there is no noise in the check codeword, the error
probability is 1/LCodeword , which has the effective identifi-
cation ability. In the actual scene, the verification codeword
is interfered by noise, and the identification failure in Fig.1
occurs.
It is a feasible way to deal with this kind of noise by
dispersing the continuous packet loss into different groups and
using the check ability of each group to reduce the noise
interference. As illustrated from Fig.3, the elements in the
matrix consists of the packet numbers, the column number
of the matrix is the group number, and the row number of the
matrix corresponds to the symbol. When continuous packet
loss noise, such as 10 ∼ 15, is processed by the mapping
matrix, the noise is allocated to packet 2 ∼ 7. The mapping
matrix pattern is beneficial to make full use of the verification
capability of each group and improve the utilization rate of
verification resources.
B. Robust Strategy Based on Inter-Codeword Check and
Verification
In the time implicit channel robustness strategy, rate free
coding such as fountain code is included, and the real message
content is restored by combining the redundant data between
multiple codewords [25]. In blockchain technology, each block
is embedded with the hash value which is obtained according
to the previous block, so when the chain reaches a certain
scale, the starting block is fully verified [26]. In the active
packet loss CTC, due to the uneven distribution of noise, using
the information in the low noise stage to verify the information
Fig. 4. The inter code check structure, the inter-codeword check information
is applied to verify the correctness of received codeword.
Fig. 5. The main checking mechanisms adopt in the proposed scheme and
its affections on CTCs channel parameters.
in the high noise stage can further improve the utilization rate
of the verification information.
As shown in Fig.4, the inter-codeword check block h j
records the hash value of the data buffer. With the randomness
and certainty of hash function, with the advance of receiving
process, the correctness of received codeword is verified
through the inter-codeword check information in the received
codeword. Even if some codewords cannot be identified by
noise interference, cascade verification is realized with the help
of effective information in other groups.
Salt adding operation is implemented in hash summary
during the calculation process, and the confidentiality of covert
timing channel is improved by combining user shared infor-
mation and RTP random fields. Because the listener can not
get the salt value, the inter-codeword check block h j cannot be
recovered correctly, and the inter-codeword check relationship
is protected. Thus, when there is noise interference, the listener
cannot distinguish the noise and signal, and the secret message
is protected.
C. Motivation
In this method, the basic modulation method is active packet
loss, and the modulation results are hidden in the network
noise. The method of multi-stage verification and error correc-
tion can effectively de noise, improve robustness and reduce
bit error rate. In the process of multi-stage verification and
error correction, salt adding and randomization are introduced
to enhance the randomness and confidentiality.
As shown in Fig.5, the key points of this method include
adjustable transmission parameters, hash-based inter-codeword
check, CRC- based codeword self-check as well as XOR
based mapping matrix check. Among them, the adjustable
transmission parameters mainly solve the balance between
the undetectability, robustness and transmission performance.
This method needs to sacrifice performance to ensure robust-
ness, so all aspects are balanced by adjusting transmission
Fig. 6. Overview of the covert timing channel based on multi-stage verification and error correction, Alice and Bob represent for sender and receiver,
respectively.
parameters. The inter-codeword check based on hash and the
codeword self check based on CRC mainly enhances the reli-
ability (robustness) of the covert timing channel and the
confidentiality of the hidden message. The mapping matrix
checking based on XOR can improve the robustness by
constructing the mapping matrix with verification ability.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
This section gives an overall description of the construction
method of the CTC. First, it introduces the design architecture,
then introduces the modulation process and data conversion
process, and finally introduces the demodulation process and
data conversion process.
A. Overview
The design overview of the CTC construction method is
illustrated in Fig.6. For the covert channel sender Alice and
the covert channel receiver Bob, it is necessary to avoid
the listener to transmit the secret messages. In order to
ensure the confidentiality of the message, both parties agree
to share the variable salt, which is used to enhance the
randomness of the transmission process. The sender first
groups the hidden messages to get the message block Di .
Next, according to the random field seed in the shared salt
and RTP, the codeword generation process calculates the
inter-codeword check information and codeword self check
information to form codeword C j . Then, referring to the
mapping matrix, the codeword is mapped to the symbol Sk ,
that is, the relative packet loss position. The symbol random-
ization process adds a random offset to each set of symbols
and converts it to the packet sequence number Pk to be
discarded.
A monitor is adopt between sender side and receiver side,
and the capability of monitor is to simulate the adversary
which keeps accessing and detecting the abnormal flows
introduced by the proposed covert channel. By adopting the
monitor, we set the schemes adversary model as bellows:
Adversary model: We assume that the main structures and
specific designs of the covert channel realized by active packet
loss have been known to the adversary. Since the NIQE will be
seriously affected, the adversary cannot modify the majority
of packet traffics and we also assume that the adversary cannot
obviously disturb the transmission of overt traffic even if the
existence of covert channel is detected. Moreover, we also
assume that the key and encrypt algorithm adopted during the
stealth communication is secure enough and only shared by
the channel senders and receivers.
The host channel is VoLTE video channel. The covert timing
channel is constructed after the packets with specific sequence
number are discarded in the active packet loss process. After
transmission through LTE network, the receiver performs the
covert channel demodulation operation. The listener is located
in LTE network and can monitor and control all packets.
In the process of demodulation, the receiver monitors the
data packet transmission and gets the lost packet’s serial ID Pk .
Referring to mapping matrix and verification rules, the symbol
extraction process converts {Pk} to the candidate symbol set
{Sk}. In the process of symbol extraction, the random offset of
each group of symbols is eliminated, and the shared salt and
seed derived from RTP are used. In the codeword identification
process, the {Sk} is converted into a candidate codeword, and
the CRC based codeword self checking information in the
codeword is verified, and the candidate codeword set {C j }
in each group is output. In the inter-codeword verification and
identification stage, the verification of the check relationship
between codewords is carried out, and the combination with
the maximum probability is selected, which is derived as the
message block d i . Finally, the message blocks are recombined,
the receiver gets the secret message, and the covert timing
channel transmission is completed.
B. Modulation Phase
As shown in Fig.7, the data flow changes in the modulation
process are mainly divided into five parts, which are basically
Fig. 7. Modulation flow of the proposed scheme: 1.secret messages grouping;
2. codeword mapping; 3. symbol randomization; 4. active dropout.
consistent with the process in the covert timing channel archi-
tecture. Firstly, the secret messages are grouped, and the length
of each data block is B L, and the equal length data block
{D1, D2, , Di } is obtained. Next, hash based inter-codeword
check is calculated on the basis of each data block, and L H AS H
bits are extracted from the summary results as H j and spliced
into the tail of di . For each {Di//h j } combination, the CRC
hash value is calculated, and LC RC bits are extracted from
the results as v j . Finally, the Di, hj, vj are combined in
order to obtain the codeword C j . Therefore, the relationship
between LCodeword and B L, L H AS H and LC RC is shown in
Eq. 1.
LCodeword = B L + L H AS H + LC RC (1)
The codeword symbol mapping process converts the binary
codeword C j into the relative offset Sk in each group. During
the mapping process, XOR check symbols are added, so the
number of Sk is more than that of C j . Next, the random
number generator is iterated based on the input random
number seed, and the random offset is added for each group of
symbols. The pseudo-random number generator has the same
random number sequence when the seeds are consistent, so the
receiver can completely restore it. By combining the shared
information of users and SSRC random field in RTP, it can
ensure that the packet loss position is different each time, resist
replay attack and enhance confidentiality. Finally, the symbol
is converted into the serial number Pk of the data packet,
which is discarded by the active packet loss process, and the
modulation process ends.
Fig. 8. Demodulation flow of the proposed scheme: 1. dropped
packet id monitoring; 2. symbol extraction; 3. codeword identification;
4. inter-codeword verification; 5. message recombination.
C. Demodulation Phase
In Fig.8, the information flow for the demodulation process
mainly includes five parts, corresponding to the demodulation
process in Fig.6. The dropped packet’s serial ID is analyzed.
According to the vacancy of the serial ID, the dropped packet
number P k is obtained. Because of the inevitable network
noise, the candidate symbols of each group are set {sk, sk · ·}
For the candidate symbols {sk, sk · ·}, the pseudo-random
number generator is iterated according to the random number
seed to eliminate the random offset in the symbol. By verifying
the XOR relation, the data symbols that conform to the rules
are identified.
In the process of codeword identification, firstly, the v j
part contained in the codeword is verified, and the candidate
codewords that meet the rules are obtained. Next, the hj part
in the codeword is verified. According to the mode of inter-
codeword check, all codeword combinations are traversed.
If the verification fails, the combination is invalid. Finally,
Fig. 9. The inter-codeword check based on Hash in the modulation phase.
a set of codeword combinations with maximum probability
{C 1, C 2, · · · , C j } are obtained. In the final message reorga-
nization process, the data blocks Di in the codeword are
combined in order to obtain hidden messages.
The covert timing channel construction method has the
transmission synchronization ability, and can ensure the mes-
sage order without synchronization clock. By combining inter
symbol check, codeword self check, inter symbol check
and mapping matrix, the noise intensity is reduced layer




This section introduces the multi-stage verification and
error correction methods in this method, including hash based
inter symbol check method, CRC-based codeword self-check
method as well as XOR check based mapping matrix check
method. The introduction of each method includes two aspects:
modulation phase and demodulation phase.
A. Inter Code Check Method Based on Hash
The parameters involved in hash based inter code verifi-
cation are L H AS H and R, salt shared by users and random
seed derived from RTP. By establishing the verification rela-
tionship between multiple groups of codewords, the cascade
verification between codewords is established.
1) Modulation Phase: In the modulation phase, the inter-
codeword check based on hash is shown in Fig.9. To establish
concatenated verification between codewords, it is necessary
to maintain the transmit buffer to record the current content
to be verified. In the initial stage, the buffer is empty. The
first group of data block D1 is added to the buffer, and hash
(D1) is calculated as H1 to splice to the end of D1, and h1
is added to the buffer. According to the sequence of group
number, the verification process is iterated in turn. When the
group number is r , the data in the buffer has accumulated
long enough to perform the reset operation. In the reset phase,
a special check block h R is generated, whose length is B L +






× R + 1 (2)
















× R + (i − 1) (5)
Fig. 10. Inter-codeword check based on HASH during the demodulation
stage.
According to the reset period R, all inter symbol check
blocks h j are calculated in turn until the end. Due to the
addition of additional check codewords in the reset phase,
the corresponding relations between I and j in Di and h j
are shown in Eq. 4 and Eq. 5. In Fig.9, the correlativeness
of the reset start message block Dε and the group number j ,
such as Eq. 2 and Eq. 3.
2) Demodulation Phase: In the demodulation phase,
the inter symbol check based on hash is shown in 10, which
is segmented according to the reset cycle R. the verification
process in each cycle is carried out separately to reduce
the calculation scale and prevent noise propagation. For the
candidate codeword set {C 1, · · · }, {C 2, · · · }, , {C R, · · · }}, all
feasible solutions form the directed acyclic graph. The starting
point is {C 1, · · · }, and each edge in the graph corresponds to
an association between codewords.
The demodulation process is similar to the graph traversal
process. Starting from the starting point, all edges are verified.
Only if the verification rules are met, the edges will be deleted
from the graph. For the nodes of non ω+ R group, when the
node out degree is 0, it means that there is no successor node
that meets the requirements. The node is judged as network
noise and removed. Finally, when there is a path from the
starting point to the node of group ω + R, it is a possible
combination of codewords. Under the interference of network
noise, the candidate combination is not unique, and the path
with the largest sum of nodes in all paths is selected as the
final result.
B. Codeword Self Checking Method Based on CRC
Based on CRC, the correctness of Di//h j is verified by
setting CRC check block v j in codeword C j . This method
is based on a single codeword, and there is no dependency
between codewords, so the modulation and demodulation
process is efficient.
1) Modulation Phase: In the modulation phase, the CRC
based inter symbol self check process is shown in Fig.11. The
codeword consists of Di , h j and v j . The CRC based codeword
check block is v j , and v j is the LC RC bits in CRC hash results.
After the calculation of CRC based codeword self check
is completed, the components of codeword are complete,
Algorithm 1 Codeword Generation
Input:message, B L, L H AS H , LC RC , R, Salt , Seed
Output:C ← {}
1 D ← group into blocks(message, B L)
2 modulated_sections ← NU L L
3 salt ← Salt ⊕ Seed






× R + (i − 1) % R + 1
6 append Di to modulated_sections
7 h j ← L H AS H bits of HASH (salt // modulated
_sections // salt)
8 C j ← append h j to Di
9 append h j to modulated_sections
10 append C j to C
11 If i mod R == 0 Then
12 C j+1← (LCodeword − LC RC) bits of HASH(salt
//modulated_sections//salt)
13 append C j + 1 to C
14 modulated_sections ← NU L L
15 End if
16 End
17 For C j in C do




and the codeword C j can be obtained by combination. The
alg. 1 describes the process from secret message to codeword,
which includes two parts: Message grouping and codeword
generation. In the process of calculating hash summary and
CRC hash value, salt adding operation is carried out to ensure
the randomness of verification information.
2) Demodulation Phase: The description of CRC based
codeword self check demodulation phase is shown in alg. 2.
For candidate symbols, only if they meet the verification
rules can they be exported as candidate codewords. In the
demodulation process, the CRC check value is recalculated to
judge whether it is consistent with the v j part of the codeword,
and if not, it will be discarded directly. In the demodulation
process, the method of adding salt and its value are consistent
with the modulation process.
C. Mapping Matrix Checking Method Based on XOR
At the same time, the number of columns in the matrix is
adjustable, which is conducive to reduce the interference of
continuous packet loss noise.
1) Modulation Phase: The mapping matrix and XOR check
in the matrix are shown in Fig.12, and the data packet number
fills the matrix in row order. For the m − th mapping matrix,
the matrix starts with Oτ+1, where τ is defined by Eq. 7. The
row number Mrows of the matrix is related to the range of the
symbol. Mrows is calculated by Eq. 6 according to LCodeword .
Mrows = 2LCodeword (6)
τ = Mcols × (m − 1)× Mrows (7)
Fig. 11. Codeword self-check based on CRC during the modulation phase.
Algorithm 2 Effective Codeword Identification
Input:S, LC RC , Salt , Seed
Input:C  ← {}
1 salt ← Salt ⊕ Seed
2 For {Sj } in S do
3 {C j } ← {}
4 For Sj in {Sj } do
5 v j , hj , Dj ← extracted from Sj
6 crc32_result ← LC RC bits of CRC32 (salt // Dj
// hj // salt)
7 If v j == crc32_result
8 append Sj to {C j }
9 End if
10 End
11 append {C j } to C 
12 Return C 





× (Mrows × Mcols )+ Mcols
× (Sk − 1)+ (k − 1) % Mcols + 1 (8)
In the mapping matrix, each packet number has its coordi-
nate value, the ordinate represents the symbol, and the abscissa
represents the grouping sequence number. The check is based
on the check of two symbols in the data matrix. As shown
in Fig.12, the XOR value S(m−1)×Mcols+1 ⊕ S(m−1)×Mcols+2
of the first two groups of symbols need to be added. The
XOR relation requires Mcols %3 = 0 for every 3 sym-
bols, so that the mapping matrix is synchronized with the
XOR cycle.
The conversion process from codeword to packet serial
number, such as algorithm alg. 3, The input parameters include
codeword set, transmission parameter and random number
seed. The first step is to add XOR check, the second step is
to add random offset, the third step is to convert the symbol
to serial number, and each step corresponds to a cycle.
The input parameters include codeword set, transmission
parameter and random number seed. The first step is to add
XOR check, the second step is to add random offset, and the
Algorithm 3 Codeword Converted to Sequence
Input:C , LCodeword , Mcols , Salt , Seed
Output:P ← {}
1 S ← {}
2 of f set ← Random (Salt ⊕ Seed)
3 For C j in C do
4 Sk ← Integer (C j ) + 1
5 append Sk to S
6 If j mod 2 == 0
7 append (Sk ⊕ Sk−1) to S
8 End if
9 End
10 For Sk in S do
11 of f set ← Random (of f set)
12 Sk ← (Sk + of f set) mod (2LCodeword ) + 1
13 End
14 For Sk in S do
15 Pk ← Pk (k, Sk)
16 append Pk to P
17 End
18 Return P
third step is to convert the symbol to serial number. The three
steps correspond to a cycle.
The first step is to add XOR check. When judging whether
it is going to the even group, the first two groups of symbols
XOR are added to the symbol set s. The second step is to
add a random offset, each iteration of pseudo-random number
generator, so that even if the same symbol, the corresponding
processing results are not the same. In the third step, the sym-
bol is mapped to the serial number, and the symbol and group
number constitute the [K , SK ] binary, which is converted into
the packet serial number according to the Eq. 8.
2) Demodulation Phase: In the demodulation process,
the symbol information is extracted according to the mapping
matrix, and the XOR check symbol is verified. The receiver
obtains the packet loss sequence number P , calculates the
group number according to Eq. 9, and extracts candidate
symbols by Eq. 10. Under the influence of noise, the candidate
symbols of each group are not unique, so the results are
Fig. 12. The phase of mapping matrix and XOR check: The check is based on the inter-codeword verification in the data matrix.


















Sj = (Sj − of f set % (2LCodeword )+ 2LCodeword ) %
(2LCodeword )+ 1 (11)
For the candidate symbols, the random offset is eliminated
first, which is shown in Eq. 11. The offsets of each group are
obtained by the iterative pseudo-random number generator,
which is the same as the modulation phase. By verifying
the XOR relationship between symbols, the first layer of
multi-layer verification can be completed. In the verification
process, using the characteristic of XOR relation, when the
symbols S1, S2, S3 satisfy S1 ⊕ S2 ⊕ S3 = 0, it is judged that
they conform to the verification rules.
V. EVALUATION
The covert timing channel evaluation based on multi-stage
verification and error correction consists of four parts: unde-
tectability test, robustness test, transmission performance test
and construction cost test. The undetectability test is composed
of IPD detection, continuous packet loss detection and interval
packet loss detection. The robustness test mainly evaluates
the average Bit Error Rate (BER) of CTC in various com-
munication scenarios with different parameters. Transmission
performance tests evaluate the transmission rate under different
parameter configuration, test the data transmission ability of
covert timing channel.
TABLE I
THE TABLE OF TEST ENVIRONMENT INFORMATION
A. Dataset and Parameters
The parameters of the covert timing channel include
LCodeword , L H AS H , LC RC , R and Mcols . The LCodeword
determines the CTC’s active packet loss density. L H AS H and
LC RC are closely correlated with robustness, which represent
the number of hash check blocks embedded in codewords
and CRC check blocks embedded in codewords respectively.
The parameter R represents the inter symbol check reset
period based on hash, which affects the demodulation effi-
ciency. The parameter Mcols is the number of columns in
the mapping matrix, and the complexity of the relationship
between sequence number and symbol is positively related to
the number of columns.
The software and hardware environment of the evaluation
experiment is shown in TABLE I. All the data are stored in
the MySQL database, and the modulation and demodulation
results are obtained through the covert timing channel process-
ing logic based on QT. According to the modulation and
demodulation results, the undetectability is evaluated. Based
on Python script, the packet capture results are restored to
video data, and the video quality before and after modulation
is evaluated, and the test results of covert channel construction
cost are obtained. In addition, in order to effectively evaluate
the robustness and compare the BER levels under various
dropout rates, four kinds of random noises with packet loss
rates of 0.5%, 1%, 2% and 5% are generated.
Fig. 13. CDF of the packet timing interval distribution.
Fig. 14. CDF of continuous packet loss.
TABLE II
THE PARAMETER VALUE RANGE OF THE COVERT
TIMING CHANNEL DURING TESTS
The test parameters of the covert timing channel are shown
in TABLE II. The relationship among LCodeword , L H AS H ,
LC RC and B L is shown in Eq. 1.
B. Undetectability
The undetectability test covers IPD distribution, interval
packet loss number distribution and continuous packet loss
number distribution. Four different types of detection tools
are used, including CDF detection, distribution consistency
test, K-L divergence and relative distance. According to the
summary mode in TABLE III, the final detection conclusion
is obtained. Since the active dropout rate is determined by the
parameter LCodeword , the undetectability evaluation is based
on different LCodeword parameters.
TABLE III
SUMMARY OF IPD DETECTION RATE
1) IPD Testing: The CDF curve of IPD distribution is
shown in Fig.13. The covert timing channel has no effect
on CDF distribution. When the active packet loss rate of
the covert timing channel decreases, the impact on the IPD
distribution decreases, and the CDF curve can no longer detect
the difference.
The quantitative evaluation results of IPD distribution detec-
tion are shown in TABLE III. The covert timing channel can-
not be detected through IPD distribution. The current covert
timing channel detection methods are mostly based on IPD
distribution characteristics, so they have good undetectability.
Because the active packet loss rate of the covert channel is
less than 1%, it has enough concealment.
2) Continuous Packet Loss Detection: The main difference
between the two scenarios is the proportion of continuous
Fig. 15. CDF of interval packet loss number.
packet loss. In this method, active packet loss produces
discrete packet loss with length of 1. As shown in Fig.14,
the curve of excellent scene deviates, while the curve of
good scene is basically consistent. Due to the weak net-
work noise in excellent scenario, the average dropout rate
is ≤ 1%, and the covert timing channel has influence on
the curve; the average packet loss rate of good scene has
reached about 10%, while the active packet loss rate of
covert timing channel is less than 1%, so there is no
impact.
The quantitative evaluation results of continuous packet
loss detection are shown in TABLE IV. Good scenario has
good concealment. When LCodeword ≥ 7, all the detec-
tion are passed. In the excellent scenario, only when the
parameter LCodeword is greater than or equal to 9 can all
detection items be passed. Therefore, in order to ensure
that the covert timing channel has the ability of full scene
immunity detection, the parameter Lcodeword should be
LCodeword ≥ 9.
3) Interval Packet Loss Detection: In the covert timing
channel based on active packet loss, there is packet loss
behavior in the fixed interval, which affects the number of
interval packet loss. The CDF curve of interval packet loss
is shown in Fig.15, and the interval length is set to 100
and 200. As shown in Fig.15(a) and Fig.15(c), the CDF
curve of covert timing channel has deviated, and the relative
deviation increases with the decrease of LCodeword . Good
TABLE IV
DETECTION RATE SUMMARY OF CONTINUOUS PACKET LOSS DETECTION
scenario is shown in Fig.15(b) and Fig.15(d). The relative
deviation of covert timing channel is smaller and has better
concealment.
The quantitative evaluation results of interval packet loss
detection are shown in TABLE V. In excellent scenario, when
LCodeword ≥ 8, the covert timing channel can pass the
detection; in good scenario, when LCodeword ≥ 9, the covert
timing channel passes all detection; when LCodeword = 8,
the covert timing channel has a high probability of passing
the detection.
4) Summary of Undetectability Test: The detection rate of
covert channel in this time is summarized in TABLE VI.
In good scenario, this method has good concealment, and
it still has a high probability of passing the detection when
LCodeword = 8. To pass all tests in all scenarios, the parameter
LCodeword should be LCodeword ≥ 9.
Fig. 16. The relationship between the average BER and Mcols .
Fig. 17. The relationship between the average BER and LCodeword .
TABLE V
DETECTION RATE SUMMARY OF INTERVAL PACKET LOSS DETECTION
TABLE VI
COVERT TIMING CHANNEL DETECTION RATE SUMMARY BASED ON
MULTI-STAGE VERIFICATION AND ERROR CORRECTION
C. Robustness Test
The evaluation index of robustness test is bit error rate.
In the covert timing channel, the parameters affecting BER
include LCodeword , L H AS H , LC RC , R and Mcols , so the
robustness evaluation mainly focuses on these five parameters.
In terms of test data set, in addition to excellent scenario and
good scenario, four different proportions of random packet
loss scenarios are also set.
The average bit error rate in excellent and good scenarios
is shown in Fig.16, Fig.17, Fig.18, Fig.19 and Fig.20. Fig.16
shows the relationship between average bit error rate and
parameter Mcols . In Fig.16(a), the BER level in excellent
scenario is already low, and increasing Mcols can reduce the
average bit error rate to a certain extent. In Fig.16(b), the BER
level in good scenario is high, and the effect of increasing
Mcols is limited.
In Fig.17, when L H AS H + LC RC remains unchanged,
increasing LCodeword leads to a growth in BER. Since the
quantity of packets corresponding to LCodeword bits data is
2LCodeword , the number of packets doubles with the increase
of 1 bit of LCodeword , and the noise intensity of each group
is also doubled under the same packet loss rate. Therefore,
in order to achieve better robustness, the parameter LCodeword
should be reduced as much as possible.
In Fig.18, the average BER decreases with the growth of
L H AS H , and the improvement effect of average bit error rate
in good scene is better. Similarly, in Fig.19, the average bit
error rate decreases with the increase of LC RC . In excellent
scenario, the average bit error rate has been at a low level, and
the effect of increasing L H AS H and LC RC is limited; in good
Fig. 18. The relationship between the average BER and L H ASH .
Fig. 19. The relationship between the average BER and LC RC .
Fig. 20. The relationship between the average BER and R.
scenario, with the increase of L H AS H + LC RC , the average
bit error rate decreases rapidly. On the other hand, increasing
LCodeword to a certain extent can accommodate more parity
bits in the codeword, so it has a positive significance in
improving robustness. In Fig.20, the average bit error rate
increases with the increase of parameter R. Since R determines
the reset period of hash based inter symbol check, the larger
R is, the longer the reset period is, and the greater the effect
of noise accumulation on robustness. In the random noise
scenario, the results of robustness test are in Fig.21. In Fig.21,
when random packet loss rate is less than 2%, the average
bit error rate changes slightly, which proves that the robust
Fig. 21. The relationship among average bit error rate and parameters in random noise scene.
method is sufficient to deal with the noise impact. When the
random packet loss noise is 5%, the average bit error rate
curve fluctuates with the change of parameters.
Through the test of the two modes, the bit error rate can be
reduced by increasing Mcols , decreasing LCodeword , increasing
L H AS H , increasing LC RC and decreasing R. According to
Eq. 1, the number of data bits B L contained in each codeword
is closely related to the length of codeword, hash check
digit L H AS H and CRC check digit LC RC . The improvement
of robustness has an impact on the detection ability and
transmission performance. The parameter configuration needs
to be considered comprehensively.
D. Transmission Performance Test
According to the design scheme of the covert timing chan-
nel, the parameters LCodeword , L H AS H , LC RC and R all affect
the transmission performance. The relationship between covert
timing channel capacity and parameters is shown in Eq. 12,
and the relationship between transmission rate and parameters
of covert timing channel is shown in Eq. 13.
Capacity = B L × R




= (LCodeword − L H AS H − LC RC)× R




Throughput = Capacity× 100× 2
3
(bps)
= (LCodeword − L H AS H − LC RC)× R




When L H AS H + LC RC = 4, the relationship between the
transmission rate of covert timing channel and LCodeword
and R is shown in Fig.22 (a). When L H AS H + LC RC = 6,
the relationship between the transmission rate of covert timing
channel and LCodeword and R is shown in Fig.22 (b). In the
excellent scenario, the transmission performance can reach
1.0 bps. By increasing the reset period R, the transmission
rate can be improved at a certain level, but it is far less than
the performance improvement brought by reducing L H AS H +
LC RC .
E. Build Cost Test
The construction cost test of the CTC mainly evaluates the
impact of the CTC in the field of video quality. The evaluation
index adopts the non reference index of NIQE (Natural Image
Quality Evaluator) [27], and the NIQE value is negatively
correlated with the video quality. The NIQE evaluation results
of covert timing channel are shown in Fig.23. Due to the
difference of network noise intensity in the two scenarios,
the video quality has been greatly different. Fig.23 (a), in the
Fig. 22. The relationship among transmission rate of CTC and LCodeword and R.
Fig. 23. NIQE evaluation results of CTC.
excellent scenario, the NIQE values under different LCodeword
are similar, and the fluctuation is small. Fig.23(b), in the good
scenario, the covert timing channel causes the fluctuation of
NIQE value, but there is no significant difference in distri-
bution. By comparing Fig.23 (a) and Fig.23 (b), compared
with the video quality loss caused by covert timing channel,
the impact of network noise on video quality loss is greater,
so the construction cost of the covert timing channel is
acceptable.
F. Summary of Test Results
Via the evaluations including the undetectability, robust-
ness, transmission performance and construction cost of the
covert timing channel, each parameter has an impact on
the index. In practical application, the covert timing channel
should have better robustness and transmission performance
on the basis of ensuring the concealment of transmission,
so it is necessary to config. parameters reasonably. According
to the test results, when LCodeword ≥ 9, it can meet the
requirements of undetectability. On the contrary, as a parasitic
channel, CTC is inevitably disturbed by noise. Therefore,
in the comprehensive evaluation, the acceptable bit error rate in
excellent scenario is set to be less than 0.1% and that in good
scenario is less than 1%, and then the parameter combination is
screened.
The comprehensive evaluation results of the covert timing
channel are shown in TABLE VII. By comparing the test
results, the better parameter configurations in excellent and
good scenarios are selected. It is illustrated from the table
that better capacity can be achieved by sacrificing certain
robustness in the excellent scenario. In good scenario, more
robust information is needed to resist noise interference,
so the transmission reliability can be guaranteed by sacrificing
performance.
TABLE VIII compares the performance and bit error rate of
several covert timing channels, namely SCC [28], AFTC [29],
coco [30], SPCC [31], and MSV-CTC (Multi-stage verification
Covert Timing Channel)-the scheme in this paper. It can be
seen that although this method loses some performance, it is
more robust than other covert timing channels.
According to the results of undetectability test, robustness
test, transmission performance test and robustness test, this
method can meet the requirements of covert timing channel.
Due to the active packet loss modulation, the covert timing
channel has good concealment in the detection method based
on IPD. After adjusting the parameter LCodeword , it passes
the test based on the number of continuous packet loss
and interval packet loss. By combining multiple levels of
check and error correction, the CTC effectively improves the
transmission robustness and reduces the bit error rate level.
TABLE VII
COMBINATION EVALUATION ON MSV-CTC
TABLE VIII
THROUGHPUT AND CAPACITY COMPARISONS AMONG THE
PROPOSED SCHEME AND OTHER SIMILAR WORKS
By adjusting the combination of transmission parameters,
when the transmission performance reaches 0.49 bps, the bit
error rate level is not higher than 0.08%, reaching the basic
level of covert timing channel.
VI. RELATED WORKS
The security issues of data transmission and storage have
been addressed in the recent researches [32]–[35]. Literatures
have discussed the implementation of covert timing channel in
wireless networks. Kiyavash and Coleman [36] implemented
the IPD covert timing channel in the CSMA/CA protocol with
trigger mechanism. Radhakrishnan et al. [37] implemented a
scheme named covert DCF under IEEE 802.11 network.
Yue et al. [38] demonstrated their covert channel technology
through existing network services, ICMP pings commands
and Trojan chat applications. Edwards et al. [39] proposed
the legitimate application of wireless time covert channel,
and proposed using covert timing channel to mitigate threats
caused by the wormhole attacks under the mobile ad-hoc
networks.
In addition, there are also some special methods in
the research of CTC building methods. Some schemes
embed secret information by changing transmission bit rate
[40], [41]; some schemes encode secret information by active
packet loss [42]; some schemes conduct covert communication
by cache consistency vulnerability [43]; some schemes hide
secret information by retransmission mechanism of some
protocols [44], and construct time covert channel by queue
scheduling [45]. There are also some methods to mix covert
timing channel with covert storage channel [46]. These meth-
ods are beneficial exploration for the research of CTC building
methods, It also provides a enlightenment on the construction
method of covert channel in this paper.
VII. CONCLUSION
The data transmission and communication security of
IoT-enabled MTS is challenged by various threats. This
paper introduces the construction method of CTC based on
multi-stage verification, focusing on reducing the transmis-
sion error rate and mitigating the threats from critical data
leakage. To enhance the reliability of CTC, the method adopts
multi-stage verification and error correction mode, including
inter symbol check based on hash, codeword self check based
on CRC and mapping matrix check based on XOR. The
experimental evaluation results reveal that the CTC can reduce
the bit error rate and guarantee the transmission performance
by flexibly organizing the transmission parameters on the
premise of ensuring the concealment of transmission. In the
excellent scenario, when the BER is ≤0.08%, the transmission
performance is kept at 0.49 bps. In the good scenario with
strong network noise, although this method loses some per-
formance, it can still maintain the transmission performance
of 0.2 bps under the condition of bit error rate less than
1%, which effectively proves the effectiveness of multi-stage
verification and error correction.
In terms of confidentiality, salt is added in the process of
hash value calculation by combining user shared information
and random fields in RTP header. At the same time, random
offsets are added to each group of symbols by iterative
pseudo-random number generator. So that even if the same
data, the packet loss position at different time is not exactly
the same. On the other hand, even if the listener knows the
transmission principle, due to the lack of key information
such as transmission parameters, the complexity of reverse
cracking is high, and the hidden message is protected. For
active listeners, only by resetting all the fields related to
the serial number can the covert timing channel be blocked
completely. Therefore, the CTC building method based on
multi-stage verification can meet the requirements of covert
timing channel index in the fields of stealthiness, reliability,
confidentiality, modulation cost and transmission performance.
There is still room for improvement in the field of robustness.
Under the extreme data transmission environment such as high
dropout rate, the decoder cannot extract the secret message
even if the CRC code has been applied. In the future, we plan
to add rateless code, such as fountain code during the message
grouping phase and recombination phase so as to mitigate the
limitation in extreme data transmission environment.
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